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THE POLITICS OF THE POSSIBLE: PERSONAL
REFLECTIONS ON A DECADE AT THE CITY
UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK SCHOOL OF LAW
Ruthann Robsont
Pragmatism. Realism. Practicality. Necessary qualities for thepractice of law, for the practice of life.' Yet too often such pro-
nouncements are mere excuses for cowardice, for shallowness, forlaziness. We circumscribe possibilities 
- for ourselves and for
others - with justifications that we are being pragmatic, realistic,
practical. We conveniently ignore any inkling we might have that
our construction of the "possible" is freighted with our political,
not to mention personal, histories. We may even begin to believe
that idealism, imagination, and utopian urges are adolescent. We
may counsel others, and ourselves, to be "mature."
The City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law and
myself may both be considered mature: CUNY is now past its fif-
teenth year and I am now past my fortieth. There is certainly an
awareness of the fragility of life.2 This essay, however, is a reminder
t Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. The author wishesto express her appreciation to Pavita Krishnaswamy for her research assistance, the
editors and staff of the law review for their invitation to write this piece, and theCUNY community, past and present, for making the writing of this article possible, in
many ways.
I I am using pragmatism and realism in their generic rather than legal senses,
although certainly legal realism and legal pragmatism have relevance. Legal realism
was a legal movement of the 1920s and 1930s composed of American law teachers andlawyers who studied the operation of law and society, rather than its abstract concep-tualization. The roots of realism are founded chiefly in pragmatism, a philosophical
method which considers the effects and practical consequences of action, rather thanthe principle or rule involved in a given case. The intellectual origins of realism havebeen attributed to the pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the sociologicaljurisprudence of Roscoe Pound, and the skepticism of Karl Llewellyn and JeromeFrank. The legal realists sought to replace legal formalism, or tie case method and
scientific approach to law, with social methods and psychological analysis, to achievethe proper social policy. Legal realism has been responsible for innovations in legal
education and a developing alliance between legal theory and empirical analysis.Pragmatism is generally considered a philosophy advocating an approach or method-
ology with no absolute principles and standards. Instead, a proposed action is evalu-ated in terms of its practical consequences. Under this theory, fundamental truth is
relative to what works out in practice.
See GERRY W. BEYER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, MODERN DIcTIONARY FOR THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 490, 635 (1993).
2 The law school community has confronted mortality many times, but perhaps
most tragically when an automobile accident in South Africa resulted in the death of
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of the virtues of immaturity. We continue to need our idealism,
our inventiveness, and our adolescent utopian urges. We must be
wary that we do not "grow conservative with age."3 We must re-
member the possibilities of radical change and progressive reform
in these spectacularly unradical and unprogressive times.
Given the present political and cultural environment, it is easy
to allow the range of what we theorize as possible to become con-
stricted. Teaching, doing scholarship, and engaging in community
work at CUNY School of Law is an antidote to narrowness. One of
my reasons for choosing to come to CUNY School of Law in 1990
(and to leave, at least to my mind, the much more hospitable cli-
mate of the San Francisco Bay area) was my perception that CUNY
would challenge me to broaden my own perceptions of political
lawyering and legal scholarship. At other law schools at which I
interviewed, it quickly became obvious that I would be a singular
token, at worst or a member of a liberal minority, at best. Al-
though there is certainly an argument to be made for choosing to
teach at such a school - I had benefited enormously from the
lone progressive professor at the conservative law school I attended
- I selfishly selected to come to a place which would never allow
me to become complacent in my politics. I wanted not only to
push others, but to be pushed myself.
For some, the fact that I had any offers to teach was astound-
ing. Reputable legal academics whose work I admired counseled
me that I was committing academic suicide by doing scholarship
on lesbian legal issues. They advised me to write about something
"safe" and then when I received tenure, it would be "possible to do
what you want."
I was not that patient.
Yet I did think about tenure. I was not so naive to believe that
two of our professors: our former dean, Haywood Bums, and a criminal clinician, M.
Shanara Gilbert. During my first semester at CUNY, Denise Carter-Bennia suffered an
untimely death. During the last few years, several members of our community, includ-
ing myself, faced life-threatening illnesses.
3 Interestingly, this famous statement from Elizabeth Cady Stanton was made in
her musings about marriage:
How this marriage question grows on me. It lies at the very foundation
of all progress. I never read a thing on this subject until I had arrived at
my present opinion. My own life, observation, thought, feeling, reason,
brought me to the conclusion. So fear not that I shall falter. I shall not
grow conservative with age. I feel a growing indifference to the praise
and blame of my race, and an increasing interest in their weal and woe.
2 ELIZABETH CADY STANTON A.s REVEALED IN HER LETTERS, DIARY, AND REMINISCENCES
83 (Theodore Stanton & Harriet Stanton Blatch eds., 1922).
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any institution that would hire me would necessarily find the sub-ject matter of my scholarship palatable. After all, I was then en-
rolled in a L.L.M. program for which I had submitted a proposal
based entirely on lesbianism and had not only been accepted but
awarded a generous scholarship, only to find on my arrival that my
work was described in publications as "women's issues," my advisor
was unable to utter the word lesbian, and the graduate studies
chair frequently mistook any identifiable lesbian (even if they were
not enrolled in the law school) for me. But CUNY seemed to em-
body a substantive progressivism. Besides, no one flinched during
the interview.
"It will not be possible to write there," one of my self-ap-
pointed advisors announced when she learned of my decision to
come to CUNY. She told me that I would never write anything
again, that I would quickly be burned out, and that although
CUNY might "sound good," the reality was far different. I was re-
minded of the consternation of the federal appellate judge for
whom I clerked when he learned I was taking ajob at legal services:
it would not be possible to write, I would quickly be burned out,
and legal services was not a realistic or practical choice. I did not
listen to the judge either.
My well-meant advisor's perception of what was possible was
shaped by her conceptions of the demands of teaching at CUNY
and the emphasis on collaborative work. While the popularity of
collaborative teaching has diminished in recent years, it is still true
that at CUNY we teach more and meet more than our colleagues at
other schools.4 Perhaps strangely, I have often found that teach-
ing and even meetings have nurtured my scholarship. Certainly,
there is the issue of time constraints: hours spent preparing for
class are hours not spent writing. Nevertheless, preparing different
courses has provided me with a breadth and depth of knowledge I
would not otherwise have acquired. Moreover, there is something
4 Our teaching methodologies mean that we not only spend more time in the
classroom and in individual conferences, but we spend more time grading, giving
feedback, and writing evaluations.
In terms of meetings, both regarding teaching and governance, our load is also
more substantial. As chair of the Professional Development Committee one year, I
sought to determine what a reasonable committee meeting load would be. Part of
this attempt consisted of fact gathering to determine if there was a norm at other law
schools. Putting out calls on various list-servs, I realized that this issue did not con-
cern most colleagues and that they spent substantially less time in meetings. I alsolearned, however, that many of my colleagues, especially minorities, including wo-
men, had complaints about being excluded from the committee process. They
wanted to spend more time in meetings, which meant having access to power.
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about teaching itself - the struggle to make complex material un-
derstandable and then to probe at its complexities - that parallels
good legal scholarship.
I did receive tenure - with legal scholarship brandishing the
term "lesbian" prominently in the title - and not once did I hear a
disparaging word about the subject matter of my work. About a
month afterwards, I was in my office filing materials, including
some related to my tenure application, when it struck me that now
I could write anything I wanted. I was free! My possibilities were
limitless. Whatever euphoria I felt was short-lived, however, as I
admitted that I had already been writing whatever I wanted. In-
deed, I felt slightly disappointed, realizing that my new-found free-
dom was not newly found at all.
In the decade since I arrived at CUNY and the seven years
since I have been tenured, the circumstances of sexual minority
law professors has certainly improved. There are many untenured
colleagues at other institutions writing exciting legal scholarship
about sexual minority issues. Yet often these professors will share
stories of being dismissed by their colleagues, being marginalized
by their administrations, and being ostracized by their students.
Furthermore, the improvement for sexual minorities in legal
academia has not been uniform. This past semester, having been
invited to apply for a visiting chair at another law school, I was
thereafter told by a member of that faculty that there were "con-
cerns" that the titles of my articles would make me a difficult "sell"
to the funder of the chair. As I told this faculty member, it has
been my experience that when one cites the fear of recrimination
from an outside authority it is most often one's own problem, in
this case homophobia, which is the issue. Yet these sincere faculty
members believe they are not being homophobic, merely "realis-
tic." By seeking to "protect" their school, they have limited the pos-
sibilities of it.
My career at CUNY is illustrative rather than unique. Each of
my colleagues at CUNY could divulge similar experiences. We are
often solicited for opportunities at other legal institutions, only to
be marginalized or even rejected because our scholarship and
politics make us a "difficult sell." Or we are paraded at conferences
or symposiums, most often carefully "balanced" by someone with
conservative views.
Not only legal academics, but law students also act cautiously
and protectively. I am often requested by students at other institu-
tions to visit their law schools and lecture on sexual minority issues.
[Vol. 3:245248
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This seems perfectly appropriate to me, but I balk at contributing
more. For example, I have been requested on several occasions to
conduct seminars or reading groups at other law schools for stu-dents interested in sexual minority issues. "We don't have anyone
on our faculty doing lesbian and gay issues," such students beseech.When I ask these students why they did not attend CUNY, they
often seem perplexed, as if I should understand their choice to
attend a law school they view as more prestigious as their most "re-
alistic" option.
The conservatism that is described as pragmatism and realism
of some students is not limited to choices regarding legal educa-
tion, but extends to choices regarding legal careers. CUNY gradu-
ates are overwhelmingly employed in the public interest field.
Many of our graduates are working at jobs our Dean and theAlumni Office rightly describe as "fabulous": they are attorneys
with renowned public interest organizations such as Center forConstitutional Rights, American Civil Liberties Union, Lambda Le-gal Defense and Education Fund, Asian American Legal Defense
Fund, American Indian Law Alliance, Gay Men's Health Crisis,Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Sanctuary for Families, and
the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights. Yet for me, the daily
and less glamorous work of public interest representing indigentpersons in criminal prosecutions, welfare hearings, evictions, immi-gration, and domestic violence is equally vital. These positions are
no longer trendy, if they ever were, but they provide not only thebackbone but the flesh of the possibilities of progressive legal
change.5 When we venerate "grassroots," this is the work we mean,
and it should be equally celebrated.
The dynamic that is exhibited by our faculty and students simi-larly applies to CUNY as an institution. Another law school's fear
of offending a particular funder of a prestigious chair pales in com-parison to CUNY's endurance of firestorms and public controver-
sies threatening the school's very existence.6 Some legal scholars
5 I continue to subscribe to this view despite the attempts to deradicalize legalservices by restricting its funding with regard to procedures such as class actions,claims such as those involving abortion, and clients especially immigrants. For an
overview and critique of the Legal Services Corporation's restrictions, see Symposium,The Future of Legal Services: Legal and Ethical Implications of the LSC Restrictions, 25 FORD-
HAM URB. LJ. 279 (1998).
6 CUNY Law Scaring Off Students, N.Y. POST, Jan. 17, 1999, at 20 (contending thatlow enrollment at CUNY is due to low bar pass rate and quality of teaching); CloseCUNY Law School, N.Y. POST, Jan. 19, 1999, at 28 (arguing that law school should be
closed because it is "an academy for 60's-style activists "); Murphy's Law at CUNY, DAILYNEWS, Dec. 15, 1997, at 30 (claiming that CUNY Law School is a failing program
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predicted in 1991 that CUNY Law School would "surely evolve into
a mainstream local law school or disappear."7 This prediction was
premised on the authors' beliefs of "irreconcilable conflicts"
among the school's efforts to reform legal education, an admission
policy valuing diversity and underrepresented populations, and
"the need to produce graduates who pass the bar."8 In 2000, our
efforts to reform legal education continue, our law students are the
most diverse in the United States, and last year our graduates
passed the New York bar examination, recognized as one of the
most difficult in the nation, at a higher rate than law schools with
more traditional curriculum, students, and pedagogy.9
Pedagogy is valued at CUNY to an unparalleled extent. From
the law school's inception, pedagogy has been a matter for serious
consideration and often idealism.1° In her article on CUNY, then
CUNY professor Joyce McConnell discussed the social justice mis-
sion of the law school. She identified the premises of our
pedagogy as diversity, experiential learning, and equality within a
structure of community.1 The notion of experiential learning is
applied to the pedagogy itself, so that we are constantly re-evaluat-
ing and reconceptualizing CUNY. For example, McConnell's arti-
cle pointed to a problem with the reproduction of hierarchies in
teaching assignments, so that white male professors taught
predominantly in the large lecture rooms while men of color and
all female professors predominantly taught in small classes, in what
were then named "houses." Since being highlighted, that problem
because of low bar pass rates); Alex Abram, The Case Against CUNY Law, DAILY NEws,
June 11, 1996, at 39 (arguing that the law school should be closed because of its poor
track record in preparing students for the legal workforce, because it is a state sub-
sidy, and because it fosters "an excessively politically correct climate"); Chris Franz,
Does CUNY Law Give Students False Hope?, STATEN ISLAND REGISTER, June 25, 1996 (con-
tending that CUNY's commitment to public interest is, among other things, mislead-
ing for students seeking careers in the legal world, because of bar pass rates and lack
of job opportunities).
7 Matthew Steffey & Paulette "Wunsch, A Report on CUNY's Experiment in Humanistic
Legal Education: Adrift Toward the Mainstream, 59 UMKC L. REv. 155, 159 (1991).
8 Id. at 176.
9 See Victoria Rivkin, Bar Pass Rates Drop for Most Area Schools, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 15,
1999) (reporting CUNY's bar pass rate as above that of Touro Law School and New
York Law School).
10 See, e.g., John M. Farago, The Pedagogy of Community: Trust and Responsibility at
CUNI' Law School, 10 NovA L.J. 465 (1986); Charles R. Halpern, A New Direction in
Legal Education: The CUNY Law School at Queens College, 10 NovA L.J. 549 (1986); How-
ard Lesnick, The Integration of Responsibility and Values: Legal Education in an Alternative
Consciousness of Lawyering and Law, 10 NovA L.J. 633 (1986); Vanessa Merton, The Cit,
University of New York Law School: An Insider's Report, 12 NovA L.J. 45 (1987).
Joyce E. McConnell, A Feminist's Perspective on Liberal Reform of Legal Education, 14
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 88-94 (1991).
[Vol. 3:245250
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has not reoccurred in subsequent years. In fact, the entire concept
of "houses," often considered foundational for CUNY, is one of the
most debated aspects of our curriculum and pedagogy. In the pastfew years, we have experimented with changing course credit allo-
cations, linking them to substantive courses taught by the same
professor, moving between individual class simulations and year-
wide simulations, and differing mixes of legal analysis, research,
lawyering skills such as interviewing and negotiating, and oral
arguments.
What were once called "houses," and then "offices," and now
"lawyering seminars," continue to be a vital part of our program.
When others exercise that most sincere form of flattery and imitate
our programs, they appropriate the form rather than the sub-
stance, not sharing our commitment to the premises on which theform is based. For example, a lawyering seminar with a simulation
on offers to buy and sell widgets is a very different enterprise than
one with a simulation regarding civil remedies for police brutality.
The acquisition of legal skills is arguably the same in both situa-
tions, but legal skills must be contextualized and challenged and
incessantly interrogated. The question of justice cannot be
bracketed.
In the large classroom, pedagogy and politics are also compan-
ions. Using as an example what I most frequently teach, constitu-
tional law courses, 2 we do not simply engage in a pedagogy which
criticizes the conservative politics of a particular Supreme Court
opinion. Our pedagogy demands students construct arguments
which have liberatory potential within the framework of the extant
and often conservative doctrine. It also means engaging in a rigor-
ous critique of the liberal opinions and exposing the timidity of
such opinions. It also means discussing Congress, state legislatures,
state constitutions, the administrative state, and local avenues, for
the possibilities that such institutions possess. And it also means
allowing law students - future attorneys, though they are - to
12 At CUNY, our constitutional law curriculum is divided between the first semes-
ter required course of LEDP (Liberty, Equality and Due Process) which focuses onFourteenth Amendment notions of equality, the second semester required courseLFR (Law and Family Relations) which includes substantive due process and procedu-
ral due process, the third semester required course, Constitutional Structures, which
concerns separation of powers and federalism, and Public Institutions, which coversthe administrative state including procedural due process and the power of govern-
mental agencies. We also have several electives, including classes on the First Amend-
ment and the constitutional dimensions of foreign powers.
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honor the possibilities of extra-legal activism directed at change in-
cluding community solutions, protests, and individual initiatives.
The pedagogy and politics of CUNY is deeply dependent upon
our students who embody CUNY's every possibility and often em-
body the very controversies addressed in the cauldron that is con-
stitutional law. People of color constitute forty-one percent of our
student population and this makes a tremendous difference when
discussing cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson, 3 Loving v. Virginia,14 Kore-
matsu v. United States, 5 Goss v. Lopez,' 6 and Croson.1 7 I cannot imag-
ine discussing Bowers v. Hardwick18 without a visible sexual minority
presence in the room. When school funding cases such as Rodri-
fuez" or public benefits cases such as Matthews v. Eldridge2 ° are the
subject, many students have a palpable knowledge of what it means
to have been educated in under-funded schools or to live on mea-
ger public benefit allotments. A colleague at another law school
once expressed how difficult it was to teach the abortion cases
when he realized it was very possible that one of the students in the
class may have had an abortion. While that is true, and certainly an
issue at CUNY given the fact that almost sixty percent of our stu-
dents are women, I cannot help but be awed by the particularity of
this professor's concerns.
13 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to Louisiana stat-
ute mandating separate but equal accommodations for white and black passengers on
railways).
14 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (declaring Virginia's miscegenation law unconstitutional).
15 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the exclusion of American citizens of Japanese
ancestry from designated areas during World War II).
16 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (hearing required before suspension of students). While
Goss v. Lopez may not seem to be a controversial case, it has resonance in my personal
history. When I was a law student, my constitutional law professor made a remark
criticizing the case to the effect that "those Puerto Rican kids didn't want to go to
school anyway." I left the classroom and went to the Dean to complain. In the meet-
ing that followed with the professor, the Dean, and myself, the professor apologized
by saying "I'm sorry, but I never knew Robson was a Puerto Rican name." When I
told him I was not, in fact, Puerto Rican, he was perplexed as to the rationale for my
taking offense at his remark. This incident serves to remind me that even seemingly
noncontroversial cases can be controversial as well as that the embodiment of minori-
ties is not the only issue.
17 Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (past societal racial discrimina-
tion does not justify the use of racial preferences or affirmative action).
18 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia's criminal sodomy statute because the
due process clause does not encompass homosexual sodomy).
19 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting a chal-
lenge to Texas' funding of school districts because it distinguished between poor and
rich neighborhoods).
20 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (pretermination hearing unnecessary for disability
benefits).
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Furthermore, CUNY students are not simply embodiments of
a certain ideal, but are thoughtful individuals with disparate view-
points. This is often manifested in student group formations: one
year there were two distinct sexual minority groups and three dif-
ferent women's law organizations. In the classroom, controversies
are also aired. For example, in a critique of the use of "high crime
areas" in Fourth Amendment doctrine 2' as a cipher for communi-
ties of color, some students of color agreed with the critique, but
others vehemently argued that the state has a responsibility to en-
force the law everywhere, including their communities. "We are
entitled to live in safe neighborhoods too," one student protested,
altering any simplistic analysis of the problem.
Thus, on a doctrinal and theoretical level we grapple with the
possibilities of progressive legal change. Within CUNY, our most
valiant internal struggles have been over the contours that our pos-
sibilities might take. While others within our community would
certainly express it differently, for me these controversies center
around reconciling our commitment to anti-elitism with our com-
mitment to providing the very best for those who have traditionally
been excluded from the law, not only as legal professionals but as
clients seeking redress. Most divisive have been our grade changes
as we gradually moved from a mastery system in which every stu-
dent eventually passed, to a rigorous pass/fail system, to a four-
tiered system which added "high pass" and "low pass," to our pre-
sent multi-tiered letter grade system. There were a few voices
21 A recent example of the problem with "high crime area" in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119 (2000), in which the Court held
that although an individual's presence in a high crime area is not without more a
sufficient reasonable articulable suspicion necessary to support a stop under Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the high crime area is certainly relevant, and when com-
bined with "unprovoked flight" is sufficient to support a Terry stop.
The high crime area issue was locally explosive in United States v. Bayless, 913 F.Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) in which District Judge Baer held that being in a high
crime area of New York City was insufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion under
Terry, even when coupled with other facts such as a late hour, a car with out of stateplates, duffel bags, and flight from police who would be recognized by members of
the community as "corrupt, abusive, and violent." Id. at 242. The opinion was widely
criticized, including in an editorial in The Wall StreetJournal which posed the ques-
tion: "Aren't the mostly minority residents of Amsterdam Avenue and 176' Street,
where the incident took place, entitled to the same level of protection as the mostly
white residents 100 blocks south on Amsterdam in the heart of New York's Yup-piedom?" Editorial, TheDrugJudge, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 26, 1996, at A10. On a rehearing
granted by Judge Baer, the government produced the second officer who observed
the events leading to the stop, as well as his report, and Judge Baer reversed himself
on credibility issues and upheld the Terry stop. United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp.
211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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within the community that were heard to argue for "realism" and
accommodation to outside forces, including our increasingly con-
servative Board of Trustees and Board of Regents, but the vast ma-
jority of us reached our various conclusions based upon our
individual perspectives about the best course for our (future) stu-
dents and their future clients.
Less contentious has been the establishment of the law review
itself, at this point not recognized as an official publication of the
law school, but accorded status only as a club, as are all of the other
twenty-five student organizations. When some students first pro-
posed a law review, the proposal was viewed with suspicion that it
would promote hierarchies. I should confess that my own hesitan-
cies when approached to be the advisor were less about hierarchy
and more about the practical and the realistic. How could a law
review establish itself without institutional support?
I agreed to be the faculty advisor despite my misgivings that
the task of establishing a law review at CUNY was impossible. Given
my adventures regarding predictions about my own legal career, as
well as my previous experiences before I even had an inkling re-
garding law school, I would be foolish to attempt to circumscribe
possibilities for others. This is especially true for CUNY students
whose resilience, determination, and resourcefulness I witness on a
daily basis. One experience which has deeply marked me has been
with my independent study students. Most, although not all, seek
to develop a paper submitted for Law and Sexuality into a law re-
view article. A number of them succeed,22 but what fascinates me
is the comparison between those who do succeed and those who
do not. The successful ones are not necessarily the ones with the
most overt initial enthusiasm, the best topics or initial papers, the
highest grades or most developed writing skills, or the greatest ex-
ternal support system. They are simply the ones who persist, as the
students forming the law review persisted, and as the students edit-
ing this sixth issue have persisted.
As CUNY must persist. I sometimes feel as if my past decade at
22 Nicole Bingham, Nevada Sex Trade: A Gamble for the Workers, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMI-
NISM 69 (1998); Matthew Carmody, Mandatoy HIVPartner Notification: Efficacy, Legality,
and Notions of Traditional Public Health, 4 TEX. F. Civ. I-ABERTIES & Civ. RTS. 107 (1999);
Laura A. Gans, Inverts, Perverts, and Converts: Sexual Orientation Conversion Therapy &
Liability, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219 (1999); Rachel Haynes, Bisexual Jurisprudence: A
Tripolar Approach to Law and Society, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 229 (1999); Margaret
McIntyre, Sex Panic or False Alarm? The Latest Round in the Feminist Debate over Pornogra-
phy, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 189 (1995); Colleen A. Sullivan, Kids, Courts & Queers:
Lesbian and Gay Youth in the Juvenile Justice and Foster Care Systems, 6J.L. & SEXuALITY 31
(1996).
[Vol. 3:245254
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CUNY is reminiscent of the decade in which I was born, the 19 50s.
Doing work on a legal history of sexual minorities, I discovered the
radicalism of many persons during the Cold War era. For example,
in 1951, the dearth of advocacy on behalf of sexual minorities led
to the founding of the Mattachine Society by several men, includ-
ing Harry Hay, Bob Hull, Chuck Rowland, and Dale Jennings. A
few years later, partially inspired by the model of the local chapter
of the Mattachine Society and reacting to its male-centeredness,
the Daughters of Bilitis was founded in San Francisco by several
women, including Del Martin and Phyllis Lyon. 2 ' Both organiza-
tions had legal goals, including the elimination of statutes criminal-
izing same-sex activities, as well as political and social purposes.
These organizations provide instructive models because they
were not immune from the conservative currents of their times,
despite their radical beginnings. 24 Nevertheless, the more radical
members persisted with many actions and activities, including pub-
lishing the magazine ONE, an issue of which was seized by the Post-
master of Los Angeles in 1954 for obscenity and thereafter litigated
contentiously until ONE's attorneys prevailed in the United States
Supreme Court.2 5 Additionally, the radical notion of a civil rights
23 Understanding the need for secrecy, both organizations took their names from
rather obscure sources. The mattachine is a medieval masked and wandering per-former and "Songs of Bilitis" is a poem by Pierre Louys about Bilitis, who supposedlylived on the Isle of Lesbos at the time of Sappho. JOHN D'EmIuO, SEXUAL POLITICS,
SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1940-1970, 67, 102 (1983).
24 Several of the Mattachine Society's founders were steeped in the politics and
traditions of the Communist party, originally leading to an organizational scheme
modeled on Communist cells and influenced by Marxist ideologies. Id. at 63. Yet by1953 the new leadership was cooperating with the FBI, releasing pamphlets that pro-
claimed that the Mattachine Society was opposed to Communism, and proposing res-
olutions that members would be required to sign national loyalty oaths and be subjectto investigations for Communist party membership. Id. at 75-86. Although the resolu-
tions were defeated, the Society had taken a decidedly conservative turn.25 When the magazine was seized, ONE, Inc., the separate organization responsi-
ble for the magazine, brought suit in federal court arguing that the magazine was notobscene. The trial judge ruled that the magazine was subject to seizure as obscene
and ONE, Inc. appealed. In ONE, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 1957),the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the magazine was "obscene
and filthy." The court rejected the argument that the magazine was published for thepurpose of dealing with homosexuality from a "scientific, historical and critical point
of view" by focusing on several selections. In one, a three-page piece of fiction enti-
tled "Sappho Remembered," the court recounted the story of a lesbian's influence
"on a young girl only twenty years of age" who was struggling between a "normal
married life with her childhood sweetheart" and life with the lesbian. According tothe court, the selection was "nothing more than cheap pornography calculated topromote lesbianism" and fell "far short of dealing with homosexuality from the scien-
tific, historical and critical point of view." The court concluded that the magazine was
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trial on the issue of sexual activity was put into practice, garnering
another legal success.26
Thus, while we often think of the decade of the 1950s as one
of unremitting conservatism, there were organizations and individ-
uals who maintained a radical attitude. Despite their particular
failings, it was their unique perspective of the possible that pro-
vided a foundation for the advancements which would follow. The
founders of the Mattachine Society might have found it inconceiv-
able that there would one day be a United States Supreme Court
case recognizing a modicum of "homosexual" rights, 27 or that an
important case before the Court this term involves discrimination
against gay men by the Boy Scouts of America.2 8 But they would
probably recognize that they laid the foundation for the edifice
that is now sexual minority rights - and they would justly criticize
it for its failures.29
therefore not mailable, and further rejected the constitutional arguments of denial of
due process and equal protection raised by ONE, Inc.
The lawyers for ONE, Inc. filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Su-
preme Court. In ONE, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), the court granted the
petition and reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a one-line opinion. The
court simply cited Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the case which had
recently changed the standard for obscenity from the one that the courts had applied
to find the issue of ONE obscene to a requirement that "to the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest." Id. At 489. Whether or not the by-then four-
year-old issue of the magazine was obscene under the Roth test was apparently never
decided by the courts.
26 As historian John D'Emilio recounts, the Mattachine Society was involved in
what is probably the first self-consciously political trial raising the issue of homosexu-
ality. Dale Jennings, one of the founders of the Mattachine Society, was arrested in a
park during what was most likely a fairly routine undercover operation. Rather than
simply pleading guilty to the charge of lewd behavior, Jennings was convinced by
other Mattachine Society founders to use the trial as an opportunity for education. In
Mattachine discussion groups, in leaflets, and in futile press releases, the focus was on
law enforcement actions in entrapment rather than on Jennings' guilt or innocence,
thus recasting the issue as one of "civil rights." The Society hired a well-known radi-
cal lawyer, George Shibley, whose closing argument at trial detailed the injustices ac-
corded to homosexuals in society. The jury deliberated for thirty-six hours, but
reported it was deadlocked, with only one juror having been in favor of a guilty ver-
dict. Rather than retry the case, the district attorney dropped the charges. JOHN
D'EMILIO, Dreams Deferred: The Birth and Betrayal of America's First Gay Liberation Move-
ment, in MAKING TROUBLE: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THE UNIVERSITY 17,
30-31 (1992).
27 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
28 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S.Ct. 2446 (2000).
29 As Harry Hay, one of the radical founders of the Mattachine Society, declared to
historian John D'Emilio who was writing in the late 1970s, the gay movement should
not lose its most revolutionary visions in the quest for what he called the "chimera of
gay civil rights." Hay disavowed the "middle class parlors of the Gay Democratic
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Similarly, we at CUNY cannot know the contents of legal pro-
gressivism in the next decades. Yet I think we can be confident
that we are doing foundational work. As long as we refuse to nar-
row our perspectives of what is possible, we will persist in our polit-
ics, our pragmatism and practicality.
Clubs" in favor of new "chemistry," "incandescence," and "dreams." JOHN D'EMILIO,
Dreams Deferred, supra note 26, at 55.
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